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RINGKASAN
Pasaran padi sering dituduh sebagai bercorak monopoli-monopsoni dari segi strukturnya mendorong
peniaga-peniaga bertindak secara pakatan dan tiada etika, membolehkan mereka mengambil keuntungan
yang sangat berlebihan. Pasaran padi dalam keadaan sebenamya adalah bersaing, tetapi kerana ujudnya
pertalian kredit telah menyekat petani-petani dari menikmati faedah-faedah pasaran persaingan. Ketidak-
stabilan pasaran beras dan tekanan harga minimum terjamin dan harga maksimum, mendesak peniaga
melakukan berbagai bagai penipuan untuk menjaga un tung marginal mereka. Walaupun pada keseluruhannya,
untung yang diperolehi adalah berpatutan, tetapi bukti gelagat yang tidak etika, menunjukkan bahawa,
keuntungan yang peniaga-peniaga perolehi adalah lebih dari sepatutnya di dalam sistem pemasaran yang adil.
SUMMARY
It has always been alleged that the padi market is monopoly-monopsonistic in structure, inclUding
the traders to behave collusively and unethically, thus reaping excessively high profit margins. However, the
market in reality is competitive but the existence of credit-tie has defied the benefits ofa competitive market
from being passed on to the farmers. The instability of the rice market and the pressure ofthe fixed minimum
support and ceiling prices, forced the traders to indulge in various malpractices to maintain their profit
margin. Though on the whole, the profit made by the traders is reasonable, the evidence ofunethical behaviour
suggests that the profit eamed is higher than it should be under a fair marketing practice.
INTRODUCTION
It has always been alleged that the padi and
rice market in Malaysia is imperfect and thus
inefficient with middlemen frequently accused of
reaping excessive and unjustified profits. Based
on the government reports and articles (Rice
Committee, 1953 and 1954, Thompson, 1964
and 1969 Biggs, 1971 and Ungku Aziz, 1964)
the rice market can be described as being highly
monopolistic and monopsonistic, exploitative,
collusive, economically inefficient and operating
with high profit margins for the traders; and to the
disadvantage of the fanners.
Obsessed by this belief, the government has
intervened in the market starting with a Guaranteed
Minimum Price of $16/- per pikul in 1949. In
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1973, the National Padi and Rice Authority (or
NPRA) was fonned and other marketing measures
were enforced with the objectives of protecting
the farmers from the grip of unscruplous middle-
men, and increasing production to achieve self-
sufficiency. The various marketing programmes
such as licensing, setting up of rural institutions,
regulatory measures, price control and grading and
specifications were introduced. The latest interven-
tion has been the introduction of a cash su bsidy of
$10 per pikul which will be shown to have asignifi-
cant impact on the market structure and has affected
performance.
The list of grievances against the middlemen
in general is unlimited. Unfortunately, the empirical
evidence to support it is thin and scanty in Malaysia
and in other developing countries. The few studies
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carried out in other developing countries, however,
have failed to provide evidence that excessive profits
earned by the market functionaries were due to
the oligopolistic nature of the market (Farruck,
1970 and Lele, 1971).
Marketing margin has been erroneously used
as the indicator of inefficiency and the results have
been inconclusive (Spinks, 1972). Marketingmargin
only indicates the magnitude of the cost of market-
ing service involved in bringing the products from
the producers to the consumers (Allen, 1959).
Comparison of the farmers' share between different
countries and even between different regions and
areas in the country is often misleading, since the
quality and quantity of services rendered by the
various marketing systems are not fully evaluated.
In fact high marketing margins have been asine qua
non for an efficient marketing system in developed
countries.
market to potential new firms which might enter
it. Two major elements of market structure will
be analysed, i.e., the degree of market concentra-
tion and barriers to entry.
Understanding of the padi and rice market
structure is made easier by studying the distribution
channel as shown in Figure 1. At the farm level,
the general observation is that there are a large
number of padi farmers selling to a relatively small
number of padi buyers composed of Farmers
Association, shopkeepers, and millers. The term
"middlemen" refers to the shopkeepers, Who,
besides merchandising, are also involved in padi
trading and financing. They also provide transport
facilities to collect the farmers' padi.
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The following analysis was based on the findings
of the market survey carried out both on the
farmers and the traders in 1978 in the Krian areal.
Objectives
The obj ectives of this paper are firstly, to
evaluate the padi and rice market structure, conduct
and performance; and secondly, to determine the
impact of government's marketing programmes on
market structure, conduct and performance, and
the farmers. However, it should be noted that the
model is not adopted in its entirety for an inevitable
reason, that is the unavailability of detail informa-
tion and data on prices and cost, trading patterns
and business relationships. This is not an uncom-
mon problem as noted by many authors (Wharton,
1962 and Elliston, 1967).
Given the inconclusive evidence on market
structure and the inadequacy of marketing margin
as an indicator of evaluating the market, the market
structure-conduct-performance approach from
industrial economics provides a better alternative
of assessing agricultural markets (Hill and Ingersent,
1976). The application of such a tool in the agricul-
tural markets in the developing countries, however,
is still limited.
Market Structure
Bain (1968) defined market structure as the
organizational characteristics of the market which
determine the relation of sellers in the market to
each other, of buyers in the market to each other,
of sellers to buyers and of sellers established in the
Fig. 1. Marketing Channel for Padi and Rice in
Krian.
According to NPRA, in 1981, there were 1,935
licensed padi buyers (including F.As). Though the
total ofvolume handled by each market intermediary
is not known, the survey conducted by the author
For the details of the research methodology used for this study see Fatimah (1980, Chapter 3).
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(Fatimah, 1980) showed that 31 per cent of the
padi marketed by farmers was sold to the millers;
the rest was sold to shopkeepers (only 0.9 per cent
was sold through the F.As). Since 89 per cent of
the padi buyers were shopkeepers we could say
that the padi market at this level was competitive
as they were trading 69 per cent of the market
surplus among them.
It is estimated that there were 1,597 millers in
Malaysia in 1981 (NPRA, 1981) excluding the
unlicensed mills. In Krian alone, there were 13
millers and they bought about 85 percent of the
total padi marketed by the farmers. The rest of
padi was either marketed direct to NPRA, millers
outside Krian or unlicensed mills. This suggests that
at the miller level, the market is less competitive.
At the wholesale level, the market is expected
to be concentrated. For instance, in Krian there
were five wholesalers receiving rice from the millers
as well as from the NPRA's complex. Though the
number of licensed wholesalers for the whole of
Malaysia is 2,165, that is more than the number of
licensed padi buyers, there is a danger that this
figure is inflated by the large number of bumiputra
wholesalers whose volume of trading is significantly
small compared to their counterparts who are trading
in large volume2 .
At the retail level, the market is highly com-
petitive as there are a large num ber of retailers in
the market. In 1981, it is reported, that there were
25,495 licensed rice retailers in the market.
The nature of competition is affected by the
barriers to entry which is defined as the extent to
which established dealers can use potential market
power without inducing new competition.
It is expected that the farm-level market is
fairly competitive due to the low barriers to entry.
This is so as capital investment and knowledge of
trading required of shopkeepers are relatively low
compared to those expected of millers.
The barriers to entry at the miller level are
expected to be high. Firstly, this is because of the
high capital investment needed to enter the com-
mercial milling industry. A miller has also to invest
in driers, transport facilities and the employment
of workers. Secondly, this is due to ethnic factors
and collusive behaviour of the traders. The survey
in Krian (Fatimah, 1980) showed that bumiputra
mills, particularly the co-operative mills, found
difficulty in getting customers for their rice as four
out of five wholesalers in Krian were non-bumiputra.
They reported that their customers would make
orders only when there was not enough supplies
from their non-bumiputra counterparts. It is well
known in Malaysia3 that there is usually a strong
family tie between traders. Thus, it is not suprising
that the bumiputra mills have been treated as "last
resorts". They were reluctant to sell to NPRA's
complex due to the low prices offered.
As in the case of millers, capital requirements
of wholesale activities are high as large amounts of
capital are needed to provide transport facilities
and storage; experience as well as skill of trading
are also other barriers to entry.
The high barriers to entry at the wholesale
market is also due to the ethnic factor. An interview
with the NPRA official revealed that the collusive
behaviour of the non-bumiputra traders contributed
to the low participation of the bumiputra entrepre-
neurs in the wholesaling business. The failure of a
bumiputra wholesaler in the past was also attributed
to other barriers, such as lack of capital, lack of
business experience, and lack of transport.
The above evidence indicates that the market
was fairly competitive, particularly at the farm
level, but was becoming less competitive at the
higher level. However, one has to be careful in
arriving at this conclusion. Though on average, in
Krian, a farmer may have a choice of five to six
buyers, in reality about 95 percent of them reported
selling to one particular buyer over a considerable
time (average dealing with a buyer per farmer was
7.7 years). The reason for this sort of {,ehaviour
was due to their heavy indebtedness to the buyers
thus creating a credit-tie as well as their preference
for a particular buyer (Fatimah, 1980). In Krian,
about 57 percent of farmers reported that they
preferred to sell to one particular buyer because he
provided credit and provisions to them. In short,
though the padi market is competitive, the credit-
tie has resulted in the confinement of farmers'
choice of buyers to one, thus defying the benefits
of a competitive market.
One of the government's measures that affects
the padi market structure is the licensing of the
mills. Before October 1980, the predominant feature
of the padi market was the existence of a large
number of unlicensed mills particularly in Kelantan,
2 There are about 1,424 bumiputra wholesalers compared to 725 non·bumiputra wholesalers as at 31st December, 1981.
3 The Ethnic factor also posses as a strong barrier to entry in countries like Thailand and Philippines (Baldwin, 1972).
That is the traders, particularly at the upper level of the market channel, are mainly controlled by Chinese traders.
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Kedah and Perak (Vokes, 1978). Studies by Vokes
(1978) indicated that their unlicensed activities
were inefficient as the average recovery rate for
these mills was generally much below 60 percent.
The wholesalers were able to reap higher profit
margins by buying the rice milled by the unlicensed
millers as it was sold at cheaper plice due to the
low overhead cost of milling. The survey in Krian
further revealed that the unlicensed activities
merely weakened the operation of some of the
Co-operative Mills which were in the process of
amalgamating with the Farmers Association to
form the new Farmers Organization. The NPRA
also found it difficult to keep track of the padi
movement.
However, the introduction of the new cash
subsidy of $10/= per pikul has changed the picture
abruptly. To ensure that they get the coupon for
the cash subsidy the farmers have to sell only to
the licensed agents or buyers. So, there was a big
rush of farmers selling their padi to the authorised
buyers leaving the unlicensed mills with no market.
As a result, most of these mills had to close down
(ANON, 1981). Therefore, the new cash subsidy
has indirectly solved the problem of unlicensed
mills in the padi market.
An NPRA report (1982) indicates that market-
ing activities of the FAs are beginning to improve.
The number of farmers and padi buyers selling
direct to the NPRA increased as indicated by the
triple amount of padi bought by NPRA'S com-
plexes. For instance the total amount of padi
bought by NPRA complexes in 1978 was 127,411
metric tonnes and it tripled to 338,207 metric
tonnes in 1981 as a result of the new cash subsidy.
A sudden large and unexpected influx of padi
to the limited capacity of some of the NPRA's
drying and milling complexes have resulted in over-
utilization of the complexes and a large amount of
padi has been left to rot due to inadequate drying
and storing capacities. In 1980, NPRA complexes
in MADA suffered a loss of $lm due to bad padi4 .
The gOlernment, however, is looking into the matter
and many more drying and milling complexes are
to be built.
Market Conduct
Market conduct as defined by Bain (1968)
refers to the patterns of behaviour that enterprises
follow in adapting or adjusting to the markets in
which they sell or buy. The aspects studied were
the buyers pricing policies and trading practices in
response to changes in the market.
4 Conversation with an NPRA official (1982).
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On the belief that the traders in the past paid
lower prices, "operating in ring" or collusively and
were involved in various forms of malpractices, the
government has taken various measures to curb
these problems. For instance, FAs were encouraged
to provide and alternative marketing outlet to
middlemen and adopt a licensing policy in which
the licensed buyers have to adhere to the exact
condi tions in the license and a Minimum Support
Price (MSP) for padi. To prevent the traders from
making large profits, various ceiling prices for the
several grades of rice have also been set up from the
miller level to the wholesaler and retailer levels.
The extent to which NPRA has managed to
ensure proper market conduct, can be gauged by
examining the market practices of the padi buyers
in terms of price of padi paid to the farmers as well
as in terms of the conditions exacted in the license.
The average price ofpadi obtained by the Krian
fanners from the millers in the main season of 1978
was $31.50 per pikul for padi class one and $28.80
per pikul for class two and $26.00 per pikul for
class three (NPRA, 1978). The average padi price
obtained from the authorised buyers were $31.00,
$27.50 and $25.50 per pikul for the padi class one,
two and three, respectively. This is compared with
the prices offered by the NPRA at her mill in
Simpang Lima as shown in Table 1.
According to the definition of the NPRA
good padi should contain less than 14 per cent of
moisture and no deduction will be made. Other
forms of deductions are for stalk and dirt, empty
and white grains, gunny :md others, which is usually
for gunny with a lot of patches.
As shown in Table 2, the average deduction per
fanner was about 9.76 katis. Out of this 5.29 katis
were deductions for moisture (Table) 3 indicating
that average moisture content of farmers' padi was
17-18 per cent. Only 11 percent of the farmers
managed to sell dry and clean padi; 40 percent of
padi sold in the market had moisture content of
more than 17 percent (Table 4).
Other than deductions for moisture content,
about 90 percent of the farmers were penalised for
dirt content in padi, which averaged 2.8 katis. About
16 percent of the fanners reported deductions
for unripe padi, the average being 2.53 katis.
Therefore, the padi marketed by the fanners
was generally poor in quality with the moisture
content between 17-18 percent which is above
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the minimum requirement of 13-14 percent. As a
result of these various forms of deductions, the
price received by farmers was reduced by $3.12,
Le. $28.38 per pikul for padi class one if sold to
the licensed padi buyer. The farmers had also to
pay transport cost, which had risen from $0.50
per pikul per mile in 1977 to $0.80 to $1.50 per
pikul per mile dUring the survey period in 1980.
The preceding evidence tends to justify the
high deduction rate imposed on the farmers as the
quality of padi was generally poor. However, the
Class of padi
Long
Medium
Short
TABLE I
Minimum Support Price for Padi at Farm Gate*
Examples of Variety
laya, Mat Candu, Kedah No.1
Mahsuri (Merah & Putih) Bahagia
Kedah No.2
Mahsuri Biasa, Kedah No.3, Tangkai
Rotan
Price per pikul
($)
30.00
28.00
26.00
Source: N.R.P.A., Bagan Serai, March 1978.
* The Minimum Support Price for Padi remained the same till to date, except that since October 1980, the farmers were
paid with cash subsidy of $10{- per pikuL
TABLE 2
Total Deduction made on Farmers for the Main Season of 1978
Deduction (kati)
Less than 5
5-10
10-15
15-20
more than 20
Average 9.76 kati's
Number of Farmers
11
43
23
9
8
94
Reporting Percentage
11.7
45.7
24.5
9.6
8.5
100
TABLE 3
The Type and Average of Deductions made on Farmers for the Main Season of 1978
Moisture content
Dirt
Umipe padi
Not winnowed padi
Gunny
n = 94
Average deduction
(kati)
5.29
2.80
2.53
2.70
2.80
168
Number of farmers
reporting
90
85
15
27
85
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TABLE 4
Details of the Deduction for Moisture Content for the Main Season 1978
Percentage of
moisture content
less than 14%
15% - 16%
16% -17%
17% -18%
18% - 19%
more than 19%
17% -18%
(average)
Dedllction
(kati)
2
4
5
6
more than 8
5.29
(average)
Number of farmers
reporting
11
19
22
17
4
17
90
deduction made on the padi could have been a little
less. This is because there are reasons to believe that
deductions made were charged unjustifiably. During
the main season of 1977, no farmers were reported
to have been penalised by m ore than 18 katis
(personal communication with NPRA, 1978).
Whereas, in the main season of 1978, as shown
earlier, nearly 18 percent of fanners were deprived
of m ore than 15 katis5 through deductions.
The reason for this seems to be the instability
of the rice market. In the main season of 1977, it
was reported that the local market for rice was fairly
good as the harvest during the season was bad.
Nearly 1,000 acres of padi were destroyed by rats
and insects. It is reported thatmpplies were available
only from four districts, i.e. Semanggul, Selinsing,
Bagan Serai and a smaller part of Kuala Kurau. This
decrease in quantity resulted in a high demand of
rice in Krian as well as from the surrounding areas
of Province Wellesley and Matang. Therefore there
was high demand for padi from the private millers
which resulted in competition among the millers
to get more padi. As a result, the price of padi
between January and April in 1977 was higher than
the MSP of padi at the NPRA's complex (Table 5).
The price of padi of class one went up as high
as $33.00 per pikul in February 1978. However,
by early March 1978, the local rice market was
deteriorating as the millers had excessive padi in
storage. Thus they were reluctant to buy more padi.
TABLE 5
Comparison of Padi Prices at Mill Level for the Main Season of 1977 and 1978 in Krian
Period
Year Type of
padi January February March April
-I-IS 16-31 1-15 16-28 1-15 16-31 1-15 16-31
1977 Long 31.50 31.50 31.50 32.00 32.00 32.00 32.00 32.00
Medium 28.00 28.00 28.00 28.00 28.50 28.50 28.50 28.50
1978 Long 31.00 32.00 32.50 33.00 31.00 30.50 29.50 30.00
Medium 28.00 32.00 30.00 30.00 28.50 28.00 28.00 28.00
Source: N.P.R.A., Bagan Serai, 1978.
S It was also revealed that the high rate of deduction in the main season of 1978 was not due to the weather as the rain
level in the two seasons did not vary very much.
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The mills in Provincp Wellesley were facing the
same problem. It was also reported that the outflow
of padi and rice outside Krian had reduced from
131,626 pikuls of padi and 153,431 pikuls of rice
(for the months of January to April 1977) to
44,260 pikuls of padi and 47,861 pikuls of rice in
the same months of 1978. The excessive rice supply
in Krian market resulted in a fall in the price
of rice. For instance, the wholesale price of rice fell
from $97.000 per bag for the months of January-
March in 1978 to $93.50 per bag in April 1978
(Table 6).
to the millers was subjected to further deductions
which determined the size of their margin. However,
since the deduction was arbitrary and unpredictable,
depending on the quality of padi, the buyers had
to make sure that in the event of a high deduction,
it would not reduce their margins. The effect of
the deduction at the mill level on the padi buyers'
market practices and margin is shown in Table 7.
As indicated in the table, padi buyers who
were able to reduce the cost of purchase through
deducting more at the farm level than at the mill
TABLE 6
Comparison of Rice Prices at Wholesale Level for the Main Season of 1977 and 1978 in Krian
Type 1977 1978
of Rice
Jan Feb. March April Jan. Feb. March April
Al 94.00 93.50 93.50 93.50 96.00 97.50 97.50 93.50
A2 84.00 84.00 83.00 84.00 86.00 87.50 87.50 83.50
BI 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 83.00 85.50 86.00 82.00
B2 74.50 74.00 74.00 73.50 .78.50 79.00 79.50 76.00
B3 72.50 72.00 71.50 71.00 ·72.50 72.50 72.50 69.00
Source: N.P.R.A., Bagan Serai, 1978.
The fall of the price of rice put pressure on
the millers' margin as they had to buy padi at
the MSP. Under a free market, the price of padi
would fall below this level. This pressure resulted
in the millers buying less as well as at reduced cost
through citing high deduction rates on the padi.
For instance, the total amount ofpadi brought
by the millers fell from 438,998 pikuls in the
main season of 1977 to 431,700 pikuls in the main
season of 1978. Consequently, the total amount of
padi bought by the NPRA complex increased from
43 366 pikuls to 62,618 pikuls, an increase of 44
pe;cent. Usually, the padi buyers were reluctant
to sell to the NPRA because of its low price.
However, according to the NPRA official
interviewed, the buyers were reluctant to sell
to millers due to poor demand as well as the
excessive deductions.
The burden of the market pressure was also
experienced by licenced padi buyers. Padi sold
level, seemed to get a higher margin. For instance,
for buyer 1, the deduction at the farm level was
13 percent compared to 10 percent at the mill
level. He made a net margin of $1.20 per pikul
of padi. The same applied to buyer 3. However,
in the case of buyer 1 (load B), 2 and 4, the deduc-
tions at the farm level were less than the deductions
at the mill level. As a result, their net margins were
low; for instance, buyer 4 only earned a net margin
of $0.33 per pikul padi class one. In short, the
buyer anticipation of the millers' rate of deduction,
which during the survey period was high, forced
them to maintain their margin by charging a high
deduction at the farm level.
The fact that the deduction rate imposed
on padi was not consistent both at the farm
and mill levels indicates the arbitrariness of the
deduction system.6 This arbitrariness, as well as
the already poor quality of padi marketed, 7
encouraged the buyer to become involved in
6 In most cases the buyers dried the padi before selling it to the millers, which reduced the deduction rate at the mill level.
However, this is not necessarily so as proven in the case of buyers 1 (load B) and 4 in Table 11; i.e., the deduction at the
farm level is more than at the mill level.
7 The survey showed that poor quality of padi marketed was due to the existence of farm-level constraints faced by the
farmers. They are, flISt, lack of drying and cleaning facilities, second, lack of labour and third, fmancial constraints.
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TABLE 7
Calculation of Net Margin of Four Dealers on Selected Loads (per pikul of padi)
De- Average Quantity Pur- Average De- Net Sales Margin Gross Mar- Net
duction buying pur- chase Selling duction weight per margin keting margin
Buyer Load on prize chased cost price (Pikul) load per cost per
farmers ($) (pikul) pikul pikul
(kati)
A 13 26.40 50.67 1337.69 31.50 5.07 45.60 1436.40 98.71 1.95 0.75 1.20 :s::?>
......
(10%) (10%)
'Tj
-..,J >
...... ::JB 10 24.80 40.50 1004.60 28.20 3.65 36.85 1039.17 34.57 0.85 0.75 0.10 :s::
(10%) (9%) ~
2 B 8 25.34 44.80 1135.23 29.00 4.34 40.46 1173.34 38.11 0.85 0.75 0.10
(8%) (9.7%)
3 A 13 26.03 24.75 644.24 31.00 2.64 22.11 685.41 41.17 1.50 0.75 0.83
(13%) (10.7%)
4 A 8 28.00 33.25 941.00 31.00 2.06 31.19 966.89 35.89 1.08 0.75 0.33
(8%) (6.2%)
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unwarranted deductions without fear of being
verified.
With regard to the extent to which the padi
buyers have adhered to conditions in the license,
the survey showed that, though in general they
followed the conditions, there were cases of
cheating especially in weighing and in traders not
providing receipts to the fanners (Fatimah, 1980).
Market Performance
Market perfonnance is defined by Bain
(1968) as the composite end results which firms,
in any market arrive at, in pursuing whatever lines
of conduct they espouse. As for the padi and
rice market, the relevant concept in measuring
perfonnance is through the analysis of marketing
margin. To show the extent the market
functionaries took advantage of the alleged
imperfect market structure, the margin is evaluated
in tenns of the market competition and practices
(Fatimah, 1980 and Rashid 1973).
In an effort to control traders' profit margins
the government introduced the New Rice Price
Control. 8 Under this new Rice Price, the rice is
divided into various grades and maximum price
was set for all First-Hand Sales (sales by impor-
ters and millers) and also for wholesalers and
retailers. The difference in prices at the several
market levels in the various price zones is designed
to take into account production, transport costs,
insurance, rent of godown facilities and a
"reasonable" margin of profit for traders. The
MSP posed as the floor price.
Based on the above prices, we could then
estimate a "reasonable" profit margin for each of
the market functionaries. For instance, the
minuman margin specified for wholesalers and
retailers on the first eight grades of rice in zone A
are presented in Appendix I.
The miller's gross margin on the first eight
grades of rice, derived from the maximum price
of first-hand sales of rice and support price of
paid of $30 and $28 per pikul for padi class one
and class two are presented in Appendix II.
There is a clearer variation in the miller's margin
for the different grades, the reason being that
while there were 11 main sub-grades of rice,
Al-A4, B1-B4 and C1-C3, there were only three
classes of padi, 1, 2 and 3. From any given quantity
of class 1, 2 and 3, it is only possible to obtain a
certain percentage of each rice subgrade, there
being an inverse relationship between quantity
of the grade and the quantity obtained. In the
case of rice B3 and B4, the margin is negative.
However, the income realised from the sale of
by-products should be added to the miller's margin
for all grades to arrive at their total gross margin. 9
However, the miller's profit margin varies
depending on the prices paid to the seller. In
reality, the prices paid were $1.00 to $2.00
above the MSP.
The analysis of the marketing margins of the
traders and functional analysis of the margins are
presented in Tables 8 and 9, and 10. The marketing
margins for rice Al and Bl were 36 percent
and 37 percent of the retail price. Ou t of this,
12 percent was marketing costs for both grades.
With regard to profit margin for rice AI, the
dealers' share of profit margin was 2 percent,
the millers' 5 percent, the wholesalers' 3 percent
and the retailers' 5 percent.
The analysis indicates that the Krian farmers'
share of the final retail value of rice of both types
was between 64 to 65 percent. The farmers in
MADA, earned about 68 percent of the final value.
In India, it is 66.8 percent, in Indonesia it is
between 72 and 80 percent (Krishna, 1967)
whereas the fanners' share of other agricultural
produce in India ranges from 67 to 81 percent.
But the fanners' share in the developed countries
is much less. For instance, the grain producers in'
United Kingdom only receive 20 percent of the
final value of the product (Barker, 1980).
Based on the above evidence, we could say
that the rice farmers' share is high, but this does
not necessarily mean that the marketing system
is efficient. At the fann-Ievel, though the market
is competitive, the existence of various imperfec-
tions, particularly the credit-tie, has n~duced the
fanners' share of the final price.
As for the profit for the dealers, the profit
they earned seemed reasonable in view of; firstly,
the market pressure that they were facing;
secondly, the buyers also incurred various
marketing costs which were not easily verified.
These costs were incurred in their marketing-
financing-merchandising ventures which included
the costs of money loaned out by the buyers to
the farmers, consumers and intennediaries; costs
of social help extended to the fanners and cost
of entertainment at their premises. Furthennore,
the risk and uncertainties of their business were
high due to the instability of the padi and' rice
market.
8 For details see NPRA: New Rice Price Control, NPRA.
9 In Krian, the values of such by-products for a large mill amounted to $8.01 per bag of rice Al outum. Hence most of the
"loss" on the lower grades is compensated for by the sale of by-products.
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TABLE 8
Marketing Margin for a Gunny of Rice (163 katis)
Grade Al and B1 in Krian in the Main Season of 1978
Trade Level Rice A1(1) Rice B1(2)
Charges Price Charges Price
($) ($) ($) ($)
(a) Producer level
Gross Price(a) 83.88 77.00
Transport Cost(b) 1.92 1.92
Deductions(c) 8.05 7.51
Net price to producer 73.91 67.57
(b) Dealer level
Deductions 7.43 6.93
Transport cost(d) 1.10 1.10
Commission(e) 1.38 1.38
Profit 2.81 1.40
Mill gate price(f) 86.63 78.38
(c) Miller level
Milling cost 5.93 5.93
Gunny 0.70 0.70
Revenue of by-products(h) 8.01 6.41
Profit 5.95 2.91
Price per bag of rice ex-mill 91.20 81.50
(d) Wholesaler level
Transport 2.00 2.00
(from Bagan Serai to Ipoh)
Handling charges 0.40 0.40
Storage 0.25 0.25
Profit 3.65 6.35
Wholesaler price ex-Ipoh(i) 97.50 90.50
(e) Retailer level at Ipoh
Retailing cost 0.70 0.70
Profit 6.12 6.60
Retail priceG) 104.32 97.80
Value of by-product 8.01 6.42
Total [mal value 112.33 104.22
Marketing margin Marketing margin
per kati of rice per kati of rice
Al is $0.23 B1 is $0.22
Notes
(1) and (2)
(a)
It takes 2.75 pikuls of paid of
Mat Caildu and Mahsuri to produce
1 bag of rice Al and Bl, respectively,
at a conversion rate of 66 percent.
Gross price for Mat Candu is $30.50
per pikul
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(b)
Gross price for Mahsuri is $28.00 per
pikul.
Average transport cost per pikul is
$0.70 per pikul per mills.
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(c)
(d)
(e)
Average deduction per farmer is 9.76
katis per pikul and for the dealer is
9 katis per pikul.
Average transport cost for dealer is
$0.40 per pikul per mile.
Commission for dealer (miller's agent)
is $0.50 per pikul.
For padi Mahsuri:
(1) Fine Bran 20 katis
@ $0.17
(2) Course Bran 6.25 katis
@ $0.05
(3) Broken rice 8.75 katis
@ $0.31
Total
$3.40
0.31
2.71
$6.42
(f)
(h)
Mill-gate price is $31.50 per pikul
for padi Mat Candu and $28.50 for
padi Mahsurl.
Revenue of the saleable by-products
is calculated as follows:
For padi Mat Candu:
(i) The wholesale price for rice Al to
Ipoh (which is under zone B) is
$17.94 per bag of 30 katis as for B2,
the wholesale price is $15.90 per
bag of 30 katis.
The retail price of rice Al at Ipoh is
$0.64 per kati dan $0.60 per kati
for rice B1.
(1) Fine Bran 20 katis
@ $0.17 $3.40
(2) Course Bran 6.25 katis
@ $0.05 0.31
(3) Broken rice 8.75 katis
@ $0.43 4.30
Total $8.01
(k) Marketing margin for rice Al is
$112.33-$73.91 = $38.42 or $0.23
per kati; Le. 42.55% of the consumer
price. Marketing margin for rice Bl
is $104.22-$67.57. = $36.65 or
$0.22 per kati; Le. 37.47% of the
consumer price.
TABLE 9
Functional Analysis of Marketing Margin
(per bag of rice AI)
Charges/cost
($)
Percentage
of
Marketing
Margin
Percentage
of
Consumer
Price
$104.32
per bag
Transport, handling,
deduction retailing and
commission 13.01 33.87 12.47
Milling cost 5.93 15.44 5.68
Gunny 0.70 1.83 0.67
Storage 0.25 0.65 0.23
Dealer's profit 2.81 7.31 2.69
Miller's profit 5.95 15.47 5.71
Wholesaler's profit 3.65 9.50 3.50
Retailer's profit 6.12 15.93 5.87
Total 38.42 100 36.82
174
M.A. FATIMAH
TABLE 10
Functional Analysis of Marketing Margin
(a bag of rice B 1)
Charges/costs
($)
Percentage
of
Marketing
Margin
Percentage
of
Consumer
Price
$97.80
per bag
Transport, handling,
retaling commission
and deduction
Milling cost
Gunny
Storage
Dealer's profit
Miller's profit
Wholesaler's profit
Retailer's profit
Total
12.51
5.93
0.70
0.25
1.40
2.91
6.35
6.60
36.65
34.13 12.78
16.18 6.06
1.91 0.72
0.68 0.26
3.82 1.43
7.94 2.98
17.33 6.49
18.01 6.75
100 37.47
Though their profit seemed reasonable,
the evidence of m8lpractices suggest firstly that
their profit is higher than it should be under a
fair marketing practice. Secondly, it denotes the
inefficiency of the deduction system. Lastly, it
implies that the government's licensing policy and
MSP failed to ensure a fair trading practice and
thus fair prices to the farmers.
As for the millers, the profit seemed to be
reasonable in view of the fact that it was within the
limit allowed and the various milling costs incurred.
Again the fact that in the period of market
instability the millers turned to excessive deduction
to avoid losses suggests, as in the case of padi
dealers, their profits could have been a little lower,
if excessive deductions had not been carried out.
The profit margins for the wholesaler and the
retailer seemed reasonable, particularly in
comparison with the margin limits allowed by the
government. Though the retailer's margin seemed
to be the highest (i.e. 15-18 percent of the
marketing margin), it is reasonable as the market
was fairly competitive and the volume of rice
traded was small as the consumers generally only
bought small quantities of rice. However, the
evidence of fraudulent, illegal activities as well as
selling rice to another market without obtaining
permission 1 0 suggests that it was likely that in
reality, their profit could have higher.
Analysis of the marketing costs indicates
that deduction alone accounts for more than
half of the marketing cost, or 19 percent of
the marketing margin for rice AI. This suggests
that if good quality padi is produce9-, the rate
of deduction could be reduced and the deduction
at the mill level could be avoided and thus
marketing efficiency could be increased.
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Juding from the analysis, it would seem that the
market is efficient and the traders are not making
excessive profits as alleged. But this does not imply
that the market on the whole is efficient either
because imperfections have been detected both
in market structure and conduct. The imperfections
took the form of the existence of a credit-tie
10 It is frequently reported in Krian in other areas in Malaysia (Vokes, 1980) of illegal rice movement made by the
wholesalers without obtaining permits to take advantage of higher price of rice in other zones. They have been also
frequently caught fraudulently including broken rice as high as 10 per cent into a bag of rice Al (The Straits Times,
various issues 1980-81).
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which defies the benefits of competitive market
from being passed on to the farmers, excessive
unjustified deduction by padi buyers and other
market malpractices carried out by the traders.
The farmers were partly to be blamed for producing
poor quality padi which induced the buyers to
deduct excessively. However, the government's
ceiling price for rice together with the inability
to control market instability forced the traders
to maintain their squeezed margin (in the period
of excessive supply of rice) through excessive
deduction. This was made easier by the already
inefficient grading systems.
Therefore, there is a need firstly, to look
into the deduction system. Research should be
carried out to devise a method that can measure
the moisture content of padi accurately. A better
grading and specification for padi needs to be
clearly defined. Secondly, severe instabilities of
rice in the market should be avoided and this
calls for an efficient regulation of supply and
demand of rice. Thirdly, malpractices in the
market need to be reduced through a higher
enforcement of the licensing policy. There is
also a need for an economic analysis of the credit-
tie in the system. Since this is a package of
marketing plus credit services, neither service can
be fully evaluated without including the other.
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APPENDIX I
Minimum Gross Market Margins of Wholesalers and
Retailers at Maximum Prices Specified in the
Price Control Order
($1 per bag of rice)
Wholesaler's Retailer's
Rice Grade Margin Margin
($) ($)
Al 4.30 7.18
A2 4.30 7.14
A3 4.30 7.09
A4 4.30 8.06
Bl 4.30 7.67
Bl 4.40 8.15
B3 4.40 6.99
B4 4.40 8.09
SOURCE: Maxmum First Hand Sales NPRA.
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APPENDIX II
Millers Gross Margin Under Price Control on the Sale of Grade A and B Rice, Assuming Maximum First-Hand
Sale Prices and Padi Support Prices of $30 and $28 per Pikul for Class One and Class Two
($ per bag of rice)
Padi Grade
A
A
A
A
B
B
B
B
Millers
buying
price
$/pikul padi
30
30
30
30
28
28
28
28
Millers
buying
price (a)
($)
82.50
82.50
8.250
82.50
77.00
77.00
77.00
77.00
Rice
Grade
Al
A2
A3
A4
B1
B2
B3
B4
Selling Profit
price (b) margin
($) ($)
91.20 8.70
83.10 0.60
75.00 7.50
61.00 2.50
84.10 7.10
77.10 0.10
70.10 - 7.10
57.60 -19.40
SOURCE: Same as Appendix L
NOTES: (a) Based on 65 per cent recovery rate
(b) Miller's maximum price
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